



June 19, 2024

In-depth survey of the Arab public in the shadow of the ongoing war between Israel and Hamas

As a result of the war, most Arab citizens (74%) report a low level of personal security, while 67.8% report a relatively healthy economic situation • 45.3% fear harassment by Jewish citizens, but the overwhelming majority (84.1%) report that they have not been harassed • Half of the Arab public (51.6%) feels that the war has created a sense of shared destiny between Arabs and Jews • 56% believe that the recognition of a Palestinian state by European countries contributes to solving the Palestinian issue • 50.3% believe that the two-state solution is the most realistic way to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but only 24.7% believe that reconciliation between the two peoples will be achieved within a decade • If Knesset elections were held today, the expected voter turnout in the Arab community would be 54% • 68.7% support the entry of an Arab party into the reestablishment of the Joint List • 60.6% believe that the problem of violence and crime is the most important issue for the Arab public today.

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Main Findings

- As a result of the war, a large majority of the Arab public (74%) reports feeling a low level of
 personal security. In contrast, most (67.8%) report a relatively healthy economic situation.
 Additionally, half of the Arab public (51.6%) believes that the war has created a sense of shared
 destiny between Arabs and Jews in Israel, while the other half (48.4%) does not.
- Almost half of the Arab public (45.3%) currently fears harassment from Jews, while 40% report that they do not. An overwhelming majority of respondents (84.1%) say that they themselves have not experienced harassment by Jews in recent months, but a significant proportion (15.9%) reports that they have.
- A large majority of the Arab public (77.9%) believes that Arab citizens should publicly express their opinions regarding the war between Israel and Hamas, including by means of legal demonstrations.
- The Arab public is divided on who should govern the Gaza Strip the day after the war: 24.4% believe it should be governed by local Gazan entities, while the rest are divided between the Palestinian Authority (19.4%), an international force (19.4%) and Hamas (14.7%).





- 56% of the respondents believe that recognition of a Palestinian state by European countries contributes to solving the Palestinian issue. 25.9% of them believe that it has no such impact.
- Half of the Arab public (50.3%) believes that the most realistic solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a two-state solution based on the 1967 borders. The rest are divided between those who see no solution on the horizon (31.4%) and those who support a one-state solution—from the river to the sea—shared by Israelis and Palestinians (17.1%). Additionally, a large majority of the Arab public (69.1%) believes that an end to the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians and reconciliation between the two peoples is not on the horizon. In contrast, a quarter of the respondents (24.7%) believes that reconciliation between the two peoples will be achieved within 10 years.
- What is preventing or delaying the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? 44.1% believe that the main reason is the dominance of the Jewish Right in Israel, while 24% feel it is the position of the US administration. 15% believe that the peace and normalization agreements between Israel and several Arab countries are what is delaying the resolution of the conflict and only 12% point to the split between the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank and the Hamas regime in Gaza as the main delaying factor.
- A large majority of respondents (72.4%) believes that the government coalition will break up soon after the war or even before it ends. Only 14.2% think that it will last a full term (until October 2026). Looking ahead, most of the respondents (68.7%) support the inclusion of an Arab party in the government to be formed after the next elections.
- If Knesset elections were held today, the expected voter turnout in the Arab community would be 54%, similar to that observed in the 25th Knesset elections (53.2%) held in November 2022. In this scenario, Hadash-Ta'al and Ra'am are expected to exceed the electoral threshold, while Balad would be just under it. Additionally, a large majority of the Arab public (80.4%) supports the idea of recreating the Joint List from the four parties (Hadash, Ra'am, Ta'al and Balad) prior to the next Knesset elections.
- The most important issue for the Arab public continues to be the problem of violence and crime (60.6%). Other issues include solving the Palestinian problem (11.3%), the regulation of planning and construction in Arab towns (10.1%), the economic situation, employment and poverty (7.7%) and education and higher education (6.9%).
- Most of the respondents (66.6%) believe that neither the current government (headed by Netanyahu) nor the previous one (the Bennett-Lapid government) did enough to eliminate violence and crime in Arab society. However, a significant proportion (20.7%) believes that the previous government did more than the current one to address the problem.
- There are three similarly-weighted components within Arab personal identity: Israeli citizenship (29.3%), religious affiliation (28.9%) and Arab identity (28.5%). A relatively small proportion (12.5%) reports that Palestinian identity is the dominant component of their identity.





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The effect of the war on the mood of the Arab public


As a result of the war, a large majority of respondents (74%) report a weak feeling of personal security, with a significant proportion (41.2%) reporting that it is very weak. It is noteworthy that in a survey conducted in November 2023 that used the same methodology, the proportion of those reporting that their sense of personal security was adversely affected by the war was even higher (81.1%). Nonetheless, it is notable that even now, that is, eight months after the outbreak of the war, a large majority of the Arab public feels a lack of personal security.

Economically, it appears that life during the war is returning to normal. In the November 2023 survey, most respondents (64.9%) reported that their economic situation was adversely affected by the outbreak of the war. In contrast, most respondents in the current survey (67.8%) report that their economic situation is relatively healthy.

According to the responses to this question, there is a direct correlation between a respondent's level of education and his satisfaction with his economic situation. The proportion of respondents with higher levels of education who report a healthy economic situation (73.9% of those with a bachelor's degree and 78.1% of those with a master's degree or PhD) is significantly higher than among respondents with lower education levels (54.5% of those with an elementary school education and 64.3% of those with a high school education). This implies that individuals with higher education levels were able to recover from the war's economic impact more quickly than those with lower education levels.







In recent months, the sense of a lack of personal security among Arab citizens has been fueled by their concern about having less freedom of expression during the war. On several occasions, academics and students from the Arab community who criticized Israel's actions in the war or expressed solidarity with the suffering of Palestinians in the Gaza Strip were the subjects of strong criticism from the broader Israeli public. A bill submitted in early February by Knesset members from the right-wing parties (Likud and Otzma Yehudit) with the title "Prohibition of Employment of Teachers and Withdrawal of Funding from Educational Institutions for Identification with an Act of Terror or a Terror Organization (Legislative Amendments), 2024" has reinforced the feeling of persecution among the Arab public.

Nevertheless, an overwhelming majority (77.9%) of respondents believes that especially at a time like this, Arab citizens should publicly express their opinions about the war between Israel and Hamas, which includes by means of legal demonstrations. It should be noted that support for this idea has consistently remained high since the early days of the war. In a survey conducted in November 2023, the level of support was 73.6%.


The current survey found that support for publicly expressing opinions about the war increases with the level of education. For example, among those with only an elementary school education, the level of support is 71.1%, while among those with a higher level of education (post-secondary or academic), the rates are much higher: 81.8% among those with a post-secondary non-academic education, 75.6% among those with a bachelor's degree and 87.9% among those with a master's degree or PhD.


Analyzing the findings based on voting patterns in the last Knesset elections, it was found that the level of support is highest among Balad voters (86.7%) and Hadash-Ta'al voters (83.3%). These rates





are significantly higher than among Ra'am voters (77.9%). Lower levels of support were found among voters for a Jewish party (69.8%) and even among those who did not vote in the last elections (72.1%), even though these levels are high in absolute terms.









Arab-Jewish relations during the war


The relations between Arabs and Jews in Israel are influenced by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and are put to the test during a violent round of conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. In the first months following the outbreak of the war, there was noticeable tension in the relations between the two populations. At that time, many feared the recurrence of violence between Arabs and Jews in Israel, similar to the events that occurred in May 2021 during the previous round of fighting between Israel and Hamas. However, as the months passed since the events of October 7, it has become clear that the story of the current war is entirely different from the events of May 2021 with regard to the relations between the two populations.


The tension in the early days of the war was reflected in the findings of the previous survey, conducted in November 2023. At that time, most of the Arab public (69.8%) thought that solidarity between Arabs and Jews had weakened due to the war. One of the positive findings in the current survey is that half of the Arab public (51.6%) now believes that the ongoing state of war has actually created a sense of shared destiny between Arabs and Jews; a quarter of them (25.3%) feels this strongly. On the other hand, the other half (48.4%) believes that the war did not create a greater sense of solidarity and a third of them (33.6%) completely rejects the idea that there is such a sense of solidarity.

Responses to this question revealed significant variation according to religious affiliation: Christians (61.2%) and Druze (62.5%) feel that the war has created a sense of shared destiny between Arabs and Jews more than Muslims do (51.4%). Examining the responses according to Knesset voting patterns, the highest proportion was found among Hadash-Ta'al voters (58.6%), while the lowest was found among Balad voters (40.6%). Half of Ra'am voters (50.5%) and voters for a Jewish party (52.1%) believe that such a feeling was indeed created.











Notwithstanding the aforementioned, many Arab citizens continue to live in fear as a result of the war: a significant proportion of the Arab public (45.3%) currently fear harassment by Jews and a small but not insignificant percentage (15.9%) report that they have experienced harassment by Jews at least once in recent months. It is somewhat comforting that the level of fear of such harassment among the Arab public is significantly lower now than it was in the initial months of the war. Thus, in






a survey conducted in November 2023, most respondents (58.9%) reported that they feared being harassed by Jews.












The Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the "day after" in the Gaza Strip

The survey was conducted during a period of increased international interest in solving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the issue of recognizing a Palestinian state and the question of the "day after" in the Gaza Strip. At the end of May, Spain, Norway and Ireland announced their recognition of a Palestinian state and a few days later, Slovenia did as well. These moves were met with complete surprise in Israel.

Respondents were asked whether the public recognition of a Palestinian state by these countries with regard to how and when it was done—contributes to solving the Palestinian issue. Half of the respondents (51%) believe that it does contribute, while only 17.5% believe that it does not. A quarter of the respondents (25.9%) believe that the recognition of a Palestinian state has no impact on solving the Palestinian issue.

Analyzing the findings according to Knesset voting patterns shows that 67.1% of Balad voters, 62.5% of Hadash-Ta'al voters and 56.6% of Ra'am voters believe that the recognition of a Palestinian state contributes to solving the Palestinian issue. In contrast, only 31.1% of voters for a Jewish party think so.




Against this backdrop, respondents were asked the following: What is the most realistic solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? Half of them (50.3%) responded that it is a two-state solution based on the 1967 borders and about one third (31.4%) believe that there is no political solution in sight. A small proportion of the respondents (17.1%) believe that the most realistic solution is one state—from the river to the sea—that is shared by Palestinians and Jews.





Significant differences were observed in the responses to this question based on voting patterns in the last Knesset elections. The proportion of Hadash-Ta'al voters who believe that a two-state solution based on the 1967 borders is the most realistic solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (69.5%) is significantly higher than the proportion of Balad voters (59.5%) and Ra'am voters (52.7%). On the other hand, the proportion of Ra'am voters who believe that there is no political solution in sight (30%) is significantly higher than that of Balad voters (18.4%) and Hadash-Ta'al voters.(16.6%)


Paradoxically, the lowest proportion (10.1%) was found among voters for Balad, a party that emphasizes its Palestinian identity and the connection between the "1948 Arabs" and the rest of the Palestinian people. In contrast, the highest proportion (30.8%) was found among voters for Jewish parties, most of whom highlight their Israeli identity and do not define themselves as Palestinians.



This question has been asked several times in the surveys conducted by the Konrad Adenauer Program in recent years among the Arab public in Israel. Until the outbreak of the war on October 7, only a minority of the Arab public believed that the two-state approach was a realistic solution, while the majority believed that there was no solution in sight and that there would be no change in the situation. Following the outbreak of war, the two-state solution has become a more realistic option in the eyes of the Arab public relative to other alternatives, as evidenced by the findings from the two surveys conducted by the Konrad Adenauer Program during the war (November 2023 and June 2024). However, against the backdrop of the ongoing war and the lack of a clear political horizon regarding the "day after", the current survey points to a small but significant increase in the proportion of those who believe that there is no solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in sight.








In the eyes of the Arab public, the main factor preventing or delaying the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the dominance of the Jewish right wing in Israel (44.1%), followed by the position taken by the US administration (24%). Other factors include the peace and normalization agreements between several Arab countries and Israel (15%) and the division between the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank and the Hamas regime in Gaza.(12%)

Voters for Arab parties agree with respect to two factors: the dominance of the Jewish right-wing camp in Israel and the position taken by the US administration. However, differences according to political affiliation emerge within this group. Balad voters place significant responsibility on the US administration's position (36.1%), which they believe shows blind support for Israel's policies. They assign little responsibility to the peace and normalization agreements between several Arab states and Israel (10.2%) and almost none to the division between the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank and the Hamas regime in Gaza (1.7%). In contrast, Hadash-Ta'al voters criticize the Arab countries (21.2%) who they believe were too quick to sign normalization agreements with Israel, thereby sidelining the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian Authority in the West Bank and the Hamas regime in Gaze the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank and the political division between the Palestinian Authority in the Hamas regime in Gaze to quick to sign normalization agreements with Israel, thereby sidelining the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian Authority in the West Bank and the Hamas regime in Gaze division between the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank and the Hamas regime in Gaze division between the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank and the Hamas regime in Gaze division between the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank and the Hamas regime in Gaze as a delaying factor than voters for other Arab parties (13.2%).

Voters for a Jewish party agree that one of the main factors preventing or delaying the resolution of the conflict is the dominance of the Jewish right wing in Israel (35.4%), but to almost the same extent they attribute responsibility to the political division between the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank and the Hamas regime in Gaza (30.5%).












Against the backdrop of political uncertainty regarding the "day after" and the multiple possibilities being discussed in public discourse in both Israel and around the world, the following question was presented to the respondents: Who should rule the Gaza Strip after the war?

The majority (58.5%) believe that the Gaza Strip should be ruled by the Palestinians. The preferred option is local Gazan entities (24.4%), followed by the Palestinian Authority (19.4%) and finally Hamas (14.7%). On the other hand, a third of the respondents (34.4%) believe that a non-Palestinian external entity should govern the Gaza Strip after the war. The preferred option in this case is an international force (19.4%), followed by Israel (8.4%) and the Arab countries (6.5%).




The responses to this question showed significant variation according to voting patterns in the last Knesset elections. A large majority of Balad voters (74.8%) and a majority of Hadash-Ta'al (62.9%) and Ra'am (58.2%) voters, believe that the Gaza Strip should be governed by the Palestinians after the war. In contrast, only a third of the voters for a Jewish party (32.2%) think so. The two preferred options in their opinion are an international force (27%) and Israel.(23.4%)

The preferred option among voters for all Arab parties is for the Gaza Strip to be governed after the war by local Gazan entities. However, there is significant disagreement among them regarding the next most preferred option. Hadash-Ta'al and Ra'am voters clearly prefer that the Gaza Strip be governed after the war by the Palestinian Authority, while Balad voters are divided between the Palestinian Authority and the Hamas regime. Interestingly, the highest proportion (23.3%) of those who believe that Hamas should continue to govern the Gaza Strip after the war was among Balad voters (23.3%). In contrast, the lowest level of support was found among Hadash-Ta'al voters (8.5%), which is similar to the proportion of voters for a Jewish party (6.8%).







Given the complex situation described above, respondents were asked when they believe the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians will end and the two peoples will be reconciled. A clear majority of the Arab public (69.1%) does not believe that reconciliation is on the horizon. However, somewhat surprisingly, a not insignificant proportion (16.5%) believes that the conflict will end and reconciliation will be achieved within 5 years, with an additional 8.2% believing that this will occur within 7 to 10 years. Thus, a quarter of the respondents (24.7%) believe that the conflict will end and





reconciliation between the peoples will be achieved within a decade. Additionally, a small percentage (5.3%) think that reconciliation will be achieved within a generation (20-30 years).



Voters for a Jewish party hold the most pessimistic view: 74% do not believe that reconciliation is on the horizon and only 17.2% think that it will be achieved within a decade. In contrast, voters for the Arab parties hold a less pessimistic view. Although the vast majority do not see reconciliation on the horizon (70.5% of Ra'am voters, 66.6% of Hadash-Ta'al voters and 67.5% of Balad voters), a significant proportion of them believe that reconciliation between the two peoples will occur within a decade (26% of Ra'am voters, 27.8% of Hadash-Ta'al voters and 23.9% of Balad voters).






Opinions regarding the government coalition and participation in it

Following the exit of the "National Camp" led by Benny Gantz from the emergency government coalition and the growing calls for early Knesset elections among the Israeli public, survey participants were asked for their opinion on how long they believe the current government coalition will last.

The overwhelming majority (72.5%) are convinced that the coalition will soon break up, whether this occurs shortly after the war (39.3%) or even before it ends (33.2%). Only 14.2% believe that the coalition will last a full term until the next elections (October 2026).



Should an Arab party be part of the coalition formed after the next elections? A clear majority (68.6%) support such a move, with 40.2% supporting the inclusion of an Arab party in any coalition that forms—not just a center-left government. On the other hand, only 14.2% are strongly opposed to the inclusion of Arab parties in the coalition, as well as to external support of the coalition by Arab parties (by means of a "blocking bloc" in the Knesset).





Should an Arab party join the coalition to be formed after the next elections?
(percent)Yes, 68.7Any coalition that forms after the next elections, 40.2Only a center-left government, 28.5No, 30.5No, but an Arab party can support a coalition from the outside in exchange
for real gains for Arab society, 16.3An Arab party should not under any conditions join a coalition or support it
from the outside, 14.2


The supporters of an Arab party joining a coalition after the next elections (and not just a center-left coalition) include primarily the Druse (53.6%), the 18-34 age group (48.5%), voters for a Jewish party (52%), Ra'am voters (44.1%), Hadash-Ta'al voters (42.7%) and even those who did not vote in the last elections (41.9%). Only 20.7% of Balad voters support this position.


The opponents under any conditions of an Arab party joining a coalition or supporting it from the outside include some of those who did not vote in the last elections (21.5%) and also some Balad voters (18.8%) and some Hadash-Ta'al voters (16.4%). It is worth mentioning that the lowest level of opposition was found among Ra'am others (3.5%) and voters for a Jewish party (4.1%).

An examination of the trends obtained from past surveys carried out by the Konrad Adenauer Program shows that the current survey has the highest level of support among the Arab public for an Arab party joining a coalition. Thus, even during the longest and most difficult war in the history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict the political compass of the country's Arab citizens has remained intact. This represents decisive proof for the distinction they make between the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the general context and the political developments within Israel, over which they have influence.













Arab politics given the possibility of early Knesset elections

Is there an election atmosphere on the Arab street? According to the survey findings, 67% of the participants responded that they would vote if Knesset elections were held today. Given the survey data and based on past experience, the predicted turnout of Arab voters in the Knesset elections is 54%.

Given that the election campaign has not yet begun and given that the actual intentions of potential Arab voters to vote tend to strengthen as election day approaches, it can be concluded that the turnout rate found in the survey is quite high. This assumption is reinforced by a survey conducted by the Konrad Adenauer Program in October 2022, about two weeks before the 25th Knesset elections (which took place on November 1, 2022), in which the predicted turnout of Arab voters was 49%.¹ Ultimately, the actual turnout was 53.2%.

Taking these findings into account and based on past experience regarding the behavior of Arab voters, it can be predicted that if Knesset elections were held today and the three Arab lists—Hadash-Ta'al, Ra'am and Balad—ran separately, as they did in the previous elections, then Hadash-Ta'al and Ra'am would exceed the electoral threshold, with 5.2 and 4.7 seats from Arab voters, respectively. Balad would be expected to receive 3.5 seats and would be just under the electoral threshold.


In this context, a hypothetical question was presented to the respondents: In the next Knesset elections, is it desirable for the Arab parties to unite and reestablish the Joint List, which would include Hadash, Ra'am, Ta'al and Balad?


A decisive majority of the Arab public (80.4%) supports such a possibility, with 67.2% supporting it unconditionally. Among Hadash-Ta'al and Balad voters, there is almost a consensus on this issue, with particularly high support levels (93.9% and 93.1%, respectively). High levels of support were also found among Ra'am voters (75%) and among those who did not vote in the last elections (74.3%). Voters for a Jewish party support the idea to a lesser extent (63.6%). On the other hand, significant levels of opposition to such a scenario were found among voters for a Jewish party (33.9%), among Ra'am voters (25%) and among those who did not vote in the last elections (24.3%).

¹ Arik Rudnitzky, Survey among Arab voters in Israel ahead of the 25th Knesset elections, Moshe Dayan Center, October 25, 2022: <u>https://dayan.org/content/survey-among-arab-voters-israel-ahead-25th-knesset-elections</u>













The Arab public's agenda

What is the most important issue today for the Arab public? As in past surveys, the problem of violence and crime continues to top the Arab public's agenda (60.6%), overshadowing all other issues in importance, including the Palestinian issue (11.3%), regulation of planning and construction in Arab communities (10.1%), the economic situation, employment and poverty (7.7%), education and higher education (6.9%) and the unrecognized Bedouin villages in the Negev (3.4%).

There was also some variation in responses to this question according to voting patterns in the Knesset elections. The proportion of Hadash-Ta'al voters (16.6%) and Balad (16.1%) voters who believe that resolving the Palestinian issue is the most important issue is significantly higher than among Ra'am voters (6.9%), voters for a Jewish party (4.8%) and those who did not vote in the last elections (10.8%). On the other hand, regulation of planning and construction in Arab towns is more important to Ra'am voters (12.6%), voters for a Jewish party (13.3%) and those who did not vote in the last elections (11.1%) than among Hadash-Ta'al voters (6.9%) and Balad voters (7.0%).


The importance attributed to the problem of violence and crime is not surprising given the fact that the number of murder victims in the Arab community in 2023 reached an unprecedented level of 244 men and women. Moreover, the number is 83 for the period of January to May 2024, which is similar to the same period in the previous year (80).²

At the same time, it is worth mentioning that the Palestinian issue is becoming increasingly important on the agenda of Arab citizens. This can be explained by the ongoing war between Israel and Hamas, which has sparked discussion of the Palestinian issue in the international community. There is no doubt that this global discussion has had a strong influence on the Arab public. Evidence of this can be found in both the survey conducted in November 2023 and the current survey, in which the Palestinian issue ranked second in importance.

² Globes, June 10, 2024: <u>https://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1001481026</u> [Hebrew]












Participants in the survey were then asked which government—the current one (led by Netanyahu) or the previous one (the Bennett-Lapid government)—handled the problem of violence and crime in the Arab community more effectively. The majority of participants (66.6%) believe that neither government did enough to solve the problem, but a significant proportion (20.7%) believe that the previous government did more.

Given that Ra'am was part of the Bennett-Lapid government, it is not surprising that the proportion of Ra'am voters who believe that the previous government did more than the current one (38.1%) is the highest observed in the survey. The stance of Hadash-Ta'al voters is the most critical: 75.6% of them believe that neither government did enough to solve the problem.







Personal Identity

Survey participants were asked about the most important component of their personal identity. The responses indicate an equal weighting among three components: Israeli citizenship (29.3%), religious affiliation (Muslim, Christian or Druze; 28.9%) and Arab identity (28.5%). Statistically, there is no significant difference between these three components; in fact, they have equal weight. Only 12.5% of respondents stated that the most important component is Palestinian identity.

It should be noted that the Israeli component was presented to the survey participants as "citizenship" rather than "identity". In other words, the respondents were asked to assess the instrumental significance of Israeli citizenship rather than its emotional significance. Nevertheless, it is undeniable that Israeli citizenship plays as important a role as Arab identity and religious affiliation for many in Arab society. These two components represent a broad and profound collective identity, encompassing multiple elements, including religion, nationality, culture, tradition, language and values.

A comparison of the current survey's findings to those of the two surveys conducted by the Konrad Adenauer Program last year (in May and November 2023) leads to two interesting conclusions. First, the strengthening of the Israeli citizenship component observed shortly after the outbreak of the war was not a temporary phenomenon and therefore it can be inferred that the war created a new and stable trend. This finding strengthens the aforementioned point that the war created a sense of shared destiny between Arabs and Jews in Israel.

The second conclusion is that the Palestinian identity component, which significantly weakened in the early days of the war, is now on a statistically significant upward trend, although it is still at a lower level than a year ago (May 2023). Parts of the Arab public who were shocked by the Hamas terror attack on October 7 and distanced themselves from their Palestinian identity are now re-emphasizing their Palestinian identity in light of the effects of the ongoing war on their compatriots in the Gaza Strip.


Responses to this question revealed significant variation according to demographic and political group. Among the Druze, the dominant identity components are Israeli citizenship (66.1%) and Arab identity (23.2%), while among Christians, they are Israeli citizenship (36.7%) and religious affiliation (30.6%). Among Muslims, three components have similar weight: religious affiliation (30.6%), Arab identity (28.9%) and Israeli citizenship (26.8%). The Palestinian identity component is more dominant among Muslims (13.2%) relative to Christians (8.2%) and is negligible among the Druze.(1.8%)

In the younger age groups (18-34 and 35-44), religious affiliation is the dominant component of identity and its weight in these age groups is significantly higher than in the older age groups (45-54 and 55+). Conversely, in the older age groups, Israeli citizenship is the dominant component and its weight in these age groups is significantly higher than in the younger age groups. Additionally, the Palestinian identity component is significantly stronger in the youngest age group (18-34) relative to the other age groups.







An examination of identity components according to voting patterns in the last Knesset elections (November 2022) reveals that the Palestinian identity component is much more important for Balad voters (27.6%) than for Ra'am voters (10.8%) or Hadash-Ta'al voters (10.3%). The reverse is observed in the case of the Israeli citizenship component: Ra'am voters (27.5%), Hadash-Ta'al voters (28.2%) and even for those who did not vote in the last elections (30.9%) and is much more important than for Balad voters (13.3%). However, the Israeli citizenship component is much more important among voters for a Jewish party (58.8%).















The survey was initiated by the Konrad Adenauer Program for Jewish-Arab Cooperation at the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel Aviv University, in cooperation with the Israel Office of the German Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung.

The survey was carried out by the Stat-Net Research Institute under the direction of Yousef Makladeh.

The data were collected during the period June 5-11, 2024 in a telephone survey carried out in Arabic among a representative sample of the adult Arab population in Israel (aged 18+).

Size of the sample: 502. Sample error: ±4.35 percent.